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Antonio Rosato
Antonio Rosato
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Queensland and Università di Napoli Federico II
Verified email at uq.edu.au - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Selling substitute goods to loss-averse consumers: limited availability, bargains, and rip-offs
A Rosato
The RAND Journal of Economics 47 (3), 709-733, 2016
1092016
Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good
A Rosato, AA Tymula
Games and Economic Behavior 115, 188-208, 2019
492019
Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions
A Rosato
Theoretical Economics 18 (2), 561–596, 2023
32*2023
Projection of Private Values in Auctions
T Gagnon-Bartsch, M Pagnozzi, A Rosato
American Economic Review 111 (10), 3256-98, 2021
222021
Expectations-Based Loss Aversion in Auctions with Interdependent Values: Extensive vs. Intensive Risk
B Balzer, A Rosato
Management Science 67 (2), 1056-1074, 2021
182021
Sequential Negotiations with Loss-Averse Buyers
A Rosato
European Economic Review 91, 290-304, 2016
142016
Entry by takeover: Auctions vs. bilateral negotiations
M Pagnozzi, A Rosato
International Journal of Industrial Organization 44, 68-84, 2016
112016
Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives
F Herweg, A Rosato
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 29 (1), 97-121, 2020
82020
Quality is in the Eye of the Beholder: Taste Projection in Markets with Observational Learning
T Gagnon-Bartsch, A Rosato
72022
Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
B Balzer, A Rosato, J von Wangenheim
Journal of Economic Theory 205, 105545, 2022
52022
The Role of Reference-Dependent Preferences in Auctions and Negotiations
A Rosato
University of California, Berkeley, 2013
42013
Never Say Never: Optimal Exclusion and Reserve Prices with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Buyers
B Balzer, A Rosato
arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.10938, 2022
12022
An attempt to control tax evasion
A Rosato
Available at SSRN 1366665, 2008
12008
A Novel Experimental Test of Truthful Bidding in Second-Price Auctions with Real Objects
A Rosato, A Tymula
University Library of Munich, Germany, 2022
2022
'Matching Auctions' for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target
A Rosato
Available at SSRN 1371990, 2009
2009
Keep Them or Free Them: A Contract Theory model about Slaves’ Manumission
A Rosato
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Articles 1–16